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CHAPTER 8 
Insurance 
JOHN G. RY AN* 
§S.l. Life Insurance. In an age when even the most serious 
statements of public officials can be described as "no longer opera-
tive," it should not be surprising that the Supreme Judicial Court 
should describe its reversal of past precedent by stating "we now dis-
establish that proposition."1 The "disestablished" proposition occurred 
during the Survey year in Davis v. Boston Mutual Life Insurance CO.,2 
where the Court was faced with the issue of whether public policy still 
requires that an innocent beneficiary be denied recovery of an ordi-
nary life insurance benefit when the insured was killed while engaging 
in criminal activity. 3 
In Davis, plaintiff-beneficiary, who was the insured's mother, was 
seeking recovery on a life insurance policy providing both an ordinary 
life benefit and a double indemnity benefit for death caused by acci-
dental means.4 The policy also contained a specific exclusion of the 
double indemnity benefit for death caused by accidental means "if 
such death results, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially ... 
from committing an assault or a felony .... "5 The insured was shot 
and killed by a police officer while he was engaged in assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon and attempt to murder.6 The superior 
court denied plaintiff-beneficiary recovery of both the ordinary life 
and double indemnity benefits7 on the basis of a series of prior Mas-
sachusetts decisions,8 which had established that "public policy forbids 
*JOHN G. RYAN is a former Commissioner of Insurance for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. He is currently a member of the law firm of DiMento & Sullivan, Bos-
ton. 
§8.1. I Davis v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1736, 1736, 351 
N.E.2d 207, 208. 
21976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1736,351 N.E.2d 207. 
3Id. at 1736, 351 N.E.2d at 207-08. For prior cases dealing with this issue, see cases 
cited in note 8 infra. 
41976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1737-38,351 N.E.2d at 208. 
"Id. at 1738,351 N.E.2d at 208, quoting the life insurance policy. 
BId. at 1737,351 N.E.2d at 208. 
7Id. 
B In the following cases the Court denied recovery of ordinary life benefits on public 
policy grounds where the insured died as a result 'of criminal activity: Molly v. John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 327 Mass. 181,97 N.E.2d 422 (1951) (insured killed while 
1
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even an innocent beneficiary of a policy of life insurance to recover 
on the policy where the death of the insured is the result of his own 
criminal conduct."9 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's 
denial of the double indemnity benefit, but reversed its denial of the 
ordinary life benefit. io In affirming the denial of the double indem-
nity benefit, the Court found that recovery was barred by the 
policy's specific exclusion of such a benefit where death results from 
committing an assault or a felonyY More significantly, however, the 
Court indicated that it would reach the same result so far as double 
indemnity or other accidental death benefits were concerned, even if 
such an exclusion were not contained in the insurance contract, on the 
"grounds of public policy."12 While the Court in Davis did not reex-
amine the public policy against allowing recovery of double indemnity 
benefits,13 it did cite two previous decisions14 which reasoned that al-
lowing such recovery could induce criminal behavior.15 
As to the ordinary life benefit, the Court in Davis saw it as standing 
"on a different footing" from the accidental death benefit. 16 The 
Court first pointed out that the policy did not expressly exclude re-
covery of the ordinary benefit where death resulted from criminal 
behavior.17 Thus, the plaintiff-beneficiary would be entitled to recover 
committing armed robbery); Millen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 Mass. S3, 
13 N.E.2d 950 (193S) (insured executed for first degree murder); Hatch v. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550 (1S76) (insured died during the performance of an illegal abor-
tion). These cases have now been overruled by Davis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1743,351 
N.E.2d at 210. See text at notes 16-23 infra. 
In the following cases the Court denied recovery of double indemnity benefits on 
public policy grounds where the insured died as a result of criminal activity: Rosseau v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 91, II N.E.2d 921 (1937) (insured killed while 
committing auto theft); DeMello v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2S1 Mass. 190, 
IS3 N.E. 255 (1932) (insured killed while illegally transporting intoxicating liquors). 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1736, 351 N.E.2d at 207, quoting Molly v. John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 327 Mass. lSI, IS2, 97 N.E.2d 422, 423 (1951). 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1743,351 N.E.2d at 210. 
11 Id. at 1737-39, 351 N.E.2d at 20S-09. See text at note 5 supra. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1739,351 N.E.2d at 209. 
13Id. 
14 Rousseau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 91, II N.E.2d 921 (1937); De-
Mello v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2S1 Mass. 190, IS3 N.E. 255 (1932). See 
note S supra . 
.. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1739, 351 N.E.2d at 20S. Since recovery of the double in-
demnity benefit for death caused by accidential means was barred by the policy'S exclu-
sion clause, see text at note II supra, the Court stated that it need not reconsider the 
position taken in DeMello v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2S1 Mass. 190, 196, IS3 
N.E. 255, 256 (1932), that a person i~jured while committing a crime did not die by 
"accidental means" since the death was a foreseeable consequence of his own wrongful 
act. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1739, 351 N.E.2d at 20S. See generally R. KEETON, BASIC 
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(f), at 305 (1971). 
16 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1739,351 N.E.2d at 209. 
17 Id. 
2
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unless barred by public policy.I8 Looking to "the great weight of au-
thority in other jurisdictions,"19 the Court overruled the line of cases 
denying recovery of ordinary life benefits20 "in a case like the present 
one."21 This latter limitation appears in its context to be a reference to 
the beneficiary's status as an innocent party. The Court's holding ap-
pears to be based on the fact that modern life insurance policies con-
tain savings and investment features, as well as purely insurance 
features. 22 Consequently, the Court reasoned that "[f]orfeiture of sav-
ings and investment to the insurer may deter crime, but it seems out 
of harmony with related policies of modern time."23 
Thus, Davis is best read as establishing the right of an innocent ben-
eficiary to recover ordinary life insurance benefits where death is the 
result of the insured's own criminal conduct, except in circumstances 
where an applicable policy exclusion exists. 
§8.2. Liability Insurance. In Ronald Bouchard, Inc. v. Hariford Ac-
cident and Indemnity Co.,t the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon 
to apply the "completed operations hazard" clause2 contained in a pol-
icy issued by defendant-insurer to the plaintiff, Bouchard.3 Bouchard 
installed carpeting at a residence owned by one Charles E. Keene.4 
Thirty-six hours after the installation had been completed an explo-
sion occurred at Keene's home.5 Keene brought suit against Bouchard 
alleging that it was negligent in disconnecting, moving, and/or damag-
mg gas pipes while installing the carpet and that this negligence 
caused the explosion.6 Bouchard filed suit in superior court seeking a 
judgment declaring that Hartford was required to defend Bouchard 
and to pay any judgment against Bouchard up to the policy limit.7 
18/d. 
191d. at 1743,351 N.E.2d at 210. See, e.g., Dent v. Virginia Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 
226 A.2d 167 (Dist. Col. Ct. of App. 1967); Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 
Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936). 
>0 See the "ordinary life benefit" cases cited in note S sUfrra. 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1743,351 N.E.2d at 210. 
»Id. at 1739-40, 351 N .E.2d at 209. 
>3Id. See id. at 1742-43, 351 N.E.2d at 210. Cf Estate of Draper, 536 F.2d 944 (1st 
Cir. 1976), where the insurer made no attempt to deny liability after the beneficiary, 
who was also the policy's purchaser, killed the insured and then killed himself. 
§S.2. I 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 343 N.E.2d 372. 
> Such clauses provide that an insurer's liability ends when the insured's operations 
are completed. Contractor's liability insurance policies contain such clauses because they 
define the risk covered as that arising from the insured's principal activity, and they de-
fine the time covered as that during which the insured is engaged in such activity. See 
generally 11 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 44:33S, 44:344-45 (2d ed. 
1963). Coverage for risks arising out of completed operations is more in the nature of 
products liability insurance. See id. § 44:345, at 744. See note IS infra. 
31976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 633, 343 N.E.2d at 373. 
'Id. at 636, 343 N .E.2d at 374. 
"Id. 
61d. 
71d. at 633-34, 343 N.E.2d at 373. 
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Hartford claimed that it was not liable to Bouchard because of the 
"completed operations hazard" clause contained in the manufacturers' 
and contractors' liability policy issued to Bouchard.s The policy lan-
guage at issue provided as follows: "This insurance does not apply ... 
to ... property damage ... arising out of operations ... if ... [the] 
property damage occurs after such operations have been completed 
or abandoned .... "9 The policy also set out a description of when 
operations shall be considered completed, which included "when all 
operations to be performed by or on behalf of the named insured 
under the contract have been completed .... "10 
Bouchard argued that Hartford could not disclaim liability because 
(1) the damage did not arise out of "operations," and (2) even assum-
ing that the damages did arise out of operations, the operations were 
not "complete."ll Bouchard's first argument was that "operations" re-
ferred only to carpeting work because "it would be reasonable for the 
average businessman to assume that his risk from his operations is lim-
ited to his field of expertise."12 Thus, the "completed operations 
hazard" exclusion should be limited to damage arising out of some 
defect or deficiency in the carpet work and should not be extended to 
other activities, such as the incidental work done on the gas pipes in 
the process of installation.13 Bouchard bolstered this first argument 
with the principle that all ambiguities in insurance policies should be 
resolved against the insurer. 14 Bouchard's second argument was that 
the damage was continual and therefore his operations did not end 
until the explosion occurred thirty-six hours after he had physically left 
the job site.tS 
The superior court entered a decree in favor of Bouchard.16 In re-
versing the superior court, the Supreme Judicial Court, citing the 
familar principles that an insurance policy should be viewed as a 
8 Id.at 633, 636, 343 N.E.2d at 373, 374. 
9Id. at 634, 343 N.E.2d at 373 (emphasis omitted). 
I°Id. at 635, 343 N.E.2d at 373. 
11 Id. at 636-37, 343 N.E.2d at 374. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 637,343 N.E.2d at 374. 
14 Id. at 636, 343 N.E.2d at 374. For an example of the Court's formulation of this 
principle, see Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 361 
Mass. 144, 147, 279 N.E.2d 686, 688 (1972), discussed in Wadsworth, Insurance Law, 
1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 5.10, at 108-09. The principle that ambiguities should be 
resolved against the insurer appears to be of particular importance in cases interpreting 
"completed operations hazard" clauses. Compare, e.g., Glass v. Flowers, 149 So.2d 747, 
751-52 (Ct. of App. La. 1963), cert. denied, 244 La. 210, 151 So.2d 689, cert. denied, 244 
La. 212, 151 So.2d 690 (1963) ("completed operations hazard" clause bars insurer's lia-
bility where court found its language "clear and unambiguous") with Morris v. Western 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Mo. Ct. of App. 1967) ("completed operations 
hazard" clause does not bar insurer's liability where court found its language "ambigu-
ous"). 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 637, 343 N.E.2d at 374. 
16Id. at 634, 343 N.E.2d at 373. 
4
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whole and that an insurance policy's words should be given their or-
dinary significance,17 found the language clear and unambiguous and 
excused Hartford from any obligation to defend or to pay in the ac-
tion between the homeowner and Bouchard.1s 
While the result in Bouchard seems correct, the Court's reasoning 
appears to be unsatisfactory. Rather than considering Bouchard's two 
arguments independently, the Court rejected both arguments because 
it disagreed with "the central assertion that the exclusionary clause in 
the [policy] ... is ambiguous."19 The Court demonstrated the lack of 
ambiguity by showing that the language clearly limited Hartford's lia-
bility to "accidents occurring during the process of [Bouchard's] work 
.... "20 This finding, while disposing of Bouchard's argument based 
on the word "completed,"21 has little significance for Bouchard's first 
argument, which was that the damages caused by the explosion did 
not arise out of the "operations" of carpet work. 22 
In fact, the Court's only analysis of Bouchard's first argument ap-
pears to be the general statement that "[ w]e ... have no doubt that an 
insured who read the plain language of the exclusion clause ... would 
be fully informed that he would have no coverage for an event that 
occurred in the circumstances here shown."23 A more specific re-
sponse to Bouchard's "operations" argument can be obtained by 
focusing on the words "arising out of."24 Presumably the explosion 
occurred as a result of a gas leak that in turn was set in motion by 
Bouchard's carpet laying activities. The mere fact that there was an 
intermediate step between Bouchard's "operations" and the ultimate 
damage did not prevent the damage from "arising out of' those "op-
erations." 
§8.3. Automobile Insurance. The process of interpreting the 
state's "no-fault" auto insurance law continued during the Survey year 
17 [d. at 637, 343 N.E.2d at 374. See Woogmaster v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. 
Co., 312 Mass. 479, 481, 45 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1942); Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial 
Travelers Accident Ass'n, 308 Mass. 439, 442, 32 N .E.2d 250, 252 (1941). 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 639, 343 N.E.2d at 375. The Court correctly noted that 
coverage for completed operations could have been procured. See note 2 supra. 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 637, 343 N.E.2d at 374. Only Bouchard's first argument re-
lied expressly on a claim of ambiguity in the policy'S language. See text at notes 11-15 
supra. Thus, the opinion in Bouchard could be interpreted as addressing only 
Bouchard's first argument, based on the word "operations," and ignoring Bouchard's 
second argument based on the word "completed." A more reasonable interpretation, 
however, is that the Court, assuming that ambiguity was an element of Bouchard's sec-
ond argument as well, analyzed both arguments together. See text at notes 21-22 infra. 
20 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 638,343 N.E.2d at 374. 
21 See text at notes 11 & 15 supra. 
22 See text at notes 11-14 supra. 
23 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 538-39,343 N.E.2d at 375. 
2. For the language of the "completed operations hazard" clause, see the text at note 
9 supra. 
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with a Supreme Judicial Court decision l with respect to whether an 
injured employee entitled to recover lost wages under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act2 is barred from recovering lost wages under "no-
fault" by section 34A of chapter 90 of the General Laws. 3 Section 34A 
provides generally that a person injured in an automobile accident 
may recover medical expenses and lost wages up to $2,000 without 
regard to fault. 4 Section 34A, however, excludes from those people 
eligible to recover under "no-fault" any person "entitled to payments 
or benefits under the provisions of chapter one hundred and fifty-two 
(the Workmen's Compensation Act) .... "5 
§8.3. 1 Flaherty v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 340 N.E.2d 
888. 
2 G.L. c. 152. 
3 G.L. c. 90, § 34A, provides in part that the personal injury protection provisions of 
a motor vehicle liability policy or motor vehicle liability bond must: 
[Plrovide for payment to the named insured in any such motor vehicle liability pol-
icy, the obligor of any motor vehicle liability bond, members of the insured's or 
obligor's household, any authorized operator or passenger of the insured's or 
obligor's motor vehicle including a guest occupant, and any pedestrian struck by 
the insured's or obligor's motor vehicle, unless any of the aforesaid is a person en-
titled to payments or benefits under the provisions of chapter one hundred and 
fifty-two, of all reasonable expenses incurred within two years from the date of ac-
cident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, and dental services, including 
prosthetic devices and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and 
funeral services, and in the case of persons employed or self-employed at the time 
of an accident of any amounts actually lost by reason of inability to work and earn 
wages or salary or their equivalent, but not other income, that would otherwise 
have been earned in the normal course of an injured person's employment, and 
for payments in fact made to others, not members of the injured person's house-
hold and reasonably incurred in obtaining from those others ordinary and neces-
sary services in lieu of those that, had he not been injured, the injured person 
would have performed not for income but for the benefit of himself and/or mem-
bers of his household, and in the case of persons not employed or self-employed at 
the time of an accident of any loss by reason of diminution of earning power and 
for payments in fact made to others, not members of the i~ured person's house-
hold and reasonably incurred in obtaining from those others ordinary and neces-
sary services in lieu of those that, had he not been injured, the injured person 
would have performed not for income but for the benefit of himself and/or mem-
bers of his household, as a result of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including 
death at any time resulting therefrom, caused by accident and not suffered inten-
tionally while in or upon, or while entering into or alighting from, or being struck 
as a pedestrian by, the insured's or obligor's motor vehicle, without regard to neg-
ligence or gross negligence or fault of any kind, to the amount or limit of at least 
two thousand dollars on account of injury to or death of anyone person, except 
that payments for loss of wages or salary or their equivalent or, in the case of per-
sons not employed, loss by reason of diminution of earning power, shall be limited 
to amounts actually lost by reason of the accident and further limited (1) in the 
case of persons entitled to wages or salary of [sicl their equivalent under any pro-
gram for continuation of said wages or salary or their equivalent to an amount 
that, together with any payments due under such a program, will provide seventy-
five per cent of any such person's average weekly wage or salary or its equivalent 
for the year immediately preceding the accident .... 
• [d. 
'ld. 
6
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In Flaherty v. The Travelers Insurance CO.,6 the plaintiff was operating 
the insured vehicle as part of his employment when it was involved in 
a single vehicle accident and overturned. 7 He was out of work eight 
and one-half weeks and was paid workmen's compensation benefits at 
the rate of $95 per week.8 At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs 
weekly wage was $220 per week. 9 Thus under "no-fault," which pays 
lost wages at a rate of 75 percent of the injured party's average 
weekly wage,!o the plaintiff would have recovered $165 a week. 
The plaintiff filed suit in district court against the vehicle's insurer11 
to recover lost wages under "no-fault." The plaintiff argued that sec-
tion 34A 12 did not deny "no-fault" wage loss benefits to a person enti-
tled to workmen's compensation benefits because the language of the 
statute, after broadly describing the medical expenses that are recov-
erable, shifts to a more particular description of the wage loss 
benefits. 13 Thus the plaintiff argued that while the workmen's com-
pensation proviso to section 34A 14 barred recovery of medical ex-
penses under both "no-fault" and workmen's compensation, it had no 
effect on an injured party's right to recover lost wages under 
"no-fault."15 The district court and the appellate division of the dis-
trict court rejected the plaintiffs argument and found for the 
defendant. 16 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that section 34A pro-
hibits a person entitled to workmen's compensation benefits from re-
61976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100,340 N.E.2d 888. 
7 [d. at 101, 340 N.E.2d at 889. 
8 /d., 340 N .E.2d at 889-90. 
9 [d. 
10 G.L. c. 90, § 34A. For the text of § 34A, see note 3 supra. 
11 Suit was brought under G.L. c. 90, § 34M, which provides in part that: 
[W]here benefits due and payable remain unpaid for more than thirty days, any 
unpaid party shall be deemed a party to a contract with the insurer responsible for 
payment and shall therefore have a right to commence an action in contract for 
payment of amounts therein determined to be due. 
12 G.L. c. 90, § 34A. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 102-04, 340 N.E.2d at 890-91. For the text of G.L. c. 90, § 
34A, see note 3 supra. 
" G.L. c. 90, § 34A. For the text of the proviso, see the text at note 5 supra. 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 104, 340 N.E.2d at 891. The plaintiff raised another argu-
ment based on G.L. c. 90, § 34N, which allows recovery of personal injury benefits by 
persons otherwise having no such benefits. Section 34N, however, excludes "(1) a per-
son entitled to payments or benefits under the [Workmen's Compensation Act and] ... 
(2) a person who is subject to exclusion from personal injury protection benefits by in-
surers under [§ 34A] ... of this chapter." The plaintiff argued that interpreting § 34A 
to bar all recovery by persons eligible for workmen's compensation benefits rendered § 
34N's first exclusion a mere repetition of its second exclusion. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
105, 340 N.E.2d at 891. The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument by pointing out 
that § 34N's second exclusion refers to persons excludable by the insurer under § 34A 
where such persons contribute "to their own injury while under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs or while committing a felony or while intentionally causing injury to them-
selves or others." [d. at 106, 340 N.E.2d at 891-92. 
16 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 101-02,340 N.E.2d at 890. 
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covering lost wages under "no-fault."17 A reading of the statute by the 
Court, which yields only to James Joyce in the length of its sentence 
describing the "no-fault" benefits, makes the plaintiffs argument a 
plausible one. 18 The wage loss benefit is added to, and in a sense 
separate from, the medical expense benefit. 19 The Court, however, 
held that the "root description of the persons entitled to ... 
["no-fault" benefits] is shown in only one place in the ... statute [and] 
. .. followed immediately by the exclusion of those entitled to pay-
ments or benefits under [the Workmen's Compensation Act]."2o Thus, 
such a person is precluded from recovering either medical expenses 
or wage loss benefits under "no-fault." 
Flaherty is of interest because in addition to its rejection of the 
plaintiffs argument that the "no-fault" benefits should be parsed into 
two parts, one referring to medical expenses and the other referring 
to reimbursement for lost wages,21 the Court used the case to clarify 
the tort rights that survive as a result of the unavailability of a "no-
fault" benefit. As is the case in any situation where a person has no 
right to a "no-fault" benefit, his tort rights against a negligent third 
party are unaffected by the statute's tort exemption.22 Though appar-
ently not directly at issue in Flaherty, where the plaintiff was involved 
in a single car accident,23 the Court used its decision to remind the 
bar that such a party has the right to sue for and recover all special 
damages.24 
§8.4. Rate Regulation. In Attorney General v. Commissioner of 
Insurance,l [hereinafter cited as Rate case] the Supreme Judicial Court 
faced a broad challenge to the automobile insurance rates for the year 
1976 as fixed and established by the Commissioner of Insurance in 
accordance with the provisions of section 113B of chapter 175 of the 
General Laws.2 Following hearings, the Commissioner established 
industry-wide rates3 for bodily i~ury and property damage coverage 
17 [d. at 104, 340 N.E.2d at 891. 
18 Note 3 supra sets out only a portion of the sentence in G.L. c. 90, § 34A describing 
the "no-fault" benefits. 
19 See note 3 supra. 
20 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 104,340 N.E.2d at 891. 
21 See text at notes 12-15 supra. 
221976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 106,340 N.E.2d at 892. 
23 See text at note 7 supra. 
2. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 106,340 N.E.2d at 891. 
§8.4. '1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2068, 353 N.E.2d 745. 
2 G.L. c. 175, § 113B, provides in general that "[t]he commissioner shall, annually on 
or before September fifteenth, after due hearing and investigation, fix and establish ... 
just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory premium charges to be used and charged by 
companies in connection with the issue or execution of motor vehicle liability policies or 
bonds ... for the ensuing calendar year .... " 
3 On August 4, 1976, the Governor approved Acts of 1976, c. 266, which created a 
new G.L. c. 175E. Under the new chapter 175E, industry-wide rates established by the 
Commissioner have been replaced by individualized rates established by the insurers 
based in part on competition. See Rate case, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2068 n.2, 353 
8
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based on three components: an allowance for losses,4 an allowance for 
expenses,5 and an allowance for profits. 6 Petitions for review were 
filed with the Supreme Judicial Coure by both the Attorney General, 
who challenged the rates as being too high,8 and the insurers, 9 who 
challenged the rates as being too low.1O The Court upheld the rates 
N.E.2d at 749 n.2; Criffin & Hillman, Auto Insurance Reform Law, 61 MASS. L. Q. 211, 
214-15 (1!,}77). The Supreme Judicial Court's discussion of the Commissioner's rate-
making efforts in the Rate case, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2068, 353 N.E.2d 745, will retain 
significance under the new law for two reasons. First, C.L. c. 175E, § 5 empowers the 
Commissioner to "fix and establish" rates under C.L. c. 175, § 113B where he discovers 
that "competition is either (i) insufficient to assure that rates will not be excessive, or (ii) 
so conducted as to be destructive of competition or detrimental to the solvency of in-
surers .... " Second, C.L. c. 175E, § 7 requires insurers to file rate changes with the 
Commissioner for review. C.L. c. 175E, § 4 states that the standards against which these 
rates should be judged include, in addition to competition, the insurer's losses, ex-
penses, and profits-the same elements under discussion in the Rate case. See text and 
notes at notes 4-6 infra. 
4 The loss allowance is that part of each premium which will be used by the insurers 
to pay the claims of their insureds. The allowance is determined by first calculating the 
"Raw Pure Premium" for the most recent year for which there is reasonably complete 
data. The "Raw Pure Premium" is arrived at by dividing the total claims arising from 
the base year policies by the total insurance exposure for the base year. The "Raw Pure 
Premium" is then adjusted by various multiplicative factors to account for the facts that 
the data arising from the base year is not complete and that the experience during the 
current year will differ in predictable ways from the base year. See Rate case, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 2070-73, 353 N.E.2d at 750-51. The loss allowance disputes in the Rate case 
concerned the appropriate size of the multiplicative factors. See id. at 2073-86, 353 
N.E.2d at 751-57. 
• The expense allowance is that part of each premium which will be used by the in-
surer to pay cost~ such as those associated with the investigation and adjustment of 
claims, the acquisition of new customers, and the maintenance of administrative 
facilities. As with the loss allowance, the expense allowance is determined by first cal-
culating the "Expense Pure Premium" for the base year. The "Expense Pure Premium" 
is then adjusted by various multiplicative expense factors. See id. at 2087-88, 353 N.E.2d 
at 757-58. The expense allowance disputes in the Rate' case centered on the multiplica-
tive factors. See id. at 2088-92,353 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
6 The profit allowance is that part of each premium which will go to the insurer as 
profit. The most significant disputes in the Rate case concerned the Commissioner's in-
novative method of calculating the profit allowance. See id. at 2092-2106, 353 N.E.2d at 
759-65. For a further discussion of the profit allowance, see text and notes at notes 
19-38 infra. 
7 C.L. c. 175, § 113B, provides in part: 
Any person or company aggrieved by any action, order, finding, or decision of 
the commissioner under this section may, within twenty days from the filing of 
such memorandum thereof in his office, file a petition in the supreme judicial 
court for the county of Suffolk for a review of such action, order, finding, or deci-
sion. 
• See, e.g., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2105, 353 N .E.2d at 765. 
9 Insurers' interests were represented by individual insurance companies and by the 
Massachusetts Automobile Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau, an unincorporated 
association of automobile insurers. /d. at 2068-69, 353 N.E.2d at 749. 
10 See, e.g., id. at 2073, 2079-80, 353 N.E.2d at 751, 754. The insurers also argued 
that the Commissioner erred in failing to increase the 1976 bodily injury and property 
damage rates pursuant to the "second look" statute. Id. at 2106-13, 353 N.E.2d at 
765-68. The "second look" statute, inserted in C.L. c. 175, § 113B by Acts of 1971, c. 
9
Ryan: Chapter 8: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
§8.4 INSURANCE 261 
established by the Commissioner. 11 
In upholding the Commissioner's method of establishing the allow-
ances for losses and expenses,t2 the Court's opinion followed predict-
able patterns that flow from its limited scope of review in rate-making 
cases. 13 In general, when reviewing rate-making questions, the Court, 
rather than substituting its judgment for the Commissioner's, is to de-
cide whether the rates set by the Commissioner have "reasonable sup-
port in the evidence."14 On this basis, the Court disposed of most 
questions by favoring the choices between competing theories and 
facts made by the Commissioner. For example, when rejecting one of 
the numerous challenges to the allowance for losses,15 the Court sim-
ply stated: "On the whole we cannot conclude that the choice [made 
by the Commissioner] ... was wrong."16 Similarly, when upholding 
the Commissioner's allowance for expenSeS,17 the Court stated: "[W]e 
cannot say he was wrong."18 
In relation to the allowance for profits, however, the Court strained 
its scope of review by reaching for evidence not relied upon, and in 
fact apparently criticized by the Commissioner, to uphold the result 
he had reached on separate grounds. 19 For the first time, the Com-
missioner attempted to consider the insurers' investment income in es-
tablishing the allowance for profits. 20 This investment income is gen-
erated by investing the fund created through the excess of premiums, 
which are received early in the policy year, over claims, which are 
paid over several years. 21 The Commissioner's goal was to establish an 
977, § lA, and repealed by Acts of 1975, c. 707, §§ lA, 9, provided that if the Commis-
sioner found that premiums for one year were "excessive" or "inadequate," he "shall fix 
and establish premium charges for the ensuing calendar year at levels which he deter-
mines will produce adequate ... or not excessive charges for the two affected calendar 
years taken together." Acts of 1971, c. 977, § IA. In relation to the bodily irUury rate, 
the Court affirmed the Commissioner's refusal to increase the 1976 rates because the 
"second look" statute was applicable only where there was an "egregious failing either 
way." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2108, 353 N.E.2d at 766. As to the property damage rate, 
the Court affirmed the Commissioner's determination that the repeal of the "second 
look" statute, Acts of 1975, c. 707, §§ I A, 9, prior to his establishment of the property 
damage rate ended his obligation to consider the statute's impact on the 1976 rate. 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2109, 353 N.E.2d at 767. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2113, 353 N.E.2d at 768. 
12Id. at 2070-86, 353 N.E.2d at 750-57 (upholding allowance for losses); id. at 
2087-92, 353 N.E.2d at 757-59 (upholding allowance for expenses). 
13Id. at 2069 nA, 353 N.E.2d at 750 nA. 
14 Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 359 Mass. Ill, 117-18, 268 N.E.2d 
144, 148-49 (l97n. Accord, e.g., American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
335 Mass. 748, 750, 142 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1957). See generally K. DAVIS. AD~INISTRATIVE 
LAWTEXT§ 29.01 (3d ed. 1972). 
15 For the nature of the challenges to the loss allowance, see note 4 supra. 
16 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2075, 353 N.E.2d at 752. 
11 For the nature of the challenges to the expense allowance, see note 5 supra. 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2090, 353 N.E.2d at 759. 
19 See id. at 2098-2103, 353 N .E.2d at 762-64. 
2°Id. at 2093-94,353 N.E.2d at 760. 
021Id. at 2093, 353 N.E.2d at 760. See generally Birkinsha, Investment Income and Under-
writing Profit: "And Never the Twain Shall Meet"?, 8 B.C. bID. & COM. L. REV. 713 (1967). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/12
262 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §8.4 
allowance for profits which, together with investment income, would 
allow the average insurer "a rate of return on [shareholders'] invested 
capital roughly equal to that earned by businesses with similar riski-
ness in the unregulated, competitive sector of the economy."22 
An essential element of the Commissioner's allowance for profits 
was the creation of a target rate of return for insurers based on rates 
of return in unregulated industries.23 The Commissioner set the 
target rate of return at ten percent by comparing the rates of return 
for 850 of the largest domestic corporations.24 The Court found, 
however, that the Commissioner's reasoning was "open to question"25 
because he failed to consider at least three elements of risk that would 
lead potential shareholders to demand a higher rate of return from 
liability insurers. First, the Commissioner did not consider that losses 
in some lines of liability insurance are more unpredictable than in 
others.26 Second, the Commissioner made no allowance for the riski-
ness of the insurer's own investment policy.27 Finally, the Court 
pointed out that the Commissioner failed to consider the risk created 
by the ratio which the insurer adopts between premium volume and 
capitaP8 Thus, the Court concluded that "[a]n assessment of these 
risks, and perhaps others, that characterize the model insurer and a 
comparison with the risk-return relationship of unregulated enter-
prises may be thought necessary if the target return of the model in-
surer is to be properly determined."29 
22 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2093-94, 353 N.E.2d at 760. 
23 [d. at 2096, 353 N.E.2d at 761. In addition to the creation of a target rate of re-
turn, the Commissioner's procedure for calculating the allowance for profits had four 
other steps. A simplified version of those steps follows: 
I). A determination of how much income a given investment dollar would yield 
based on "risk-free" Treasury securities; 
2). A determination of how many dollars would de made available for investment by 
the excess of premiums over claims for each line of insurance; 
3). A determination of how many dollars would be made available for investment 
through shareholder-contributed capital; 
4). A determination of what profit allowance should be included in each premium 
to allow the insurer's total return to equal the target rate of return. 
See id. at 2094-97, 353 N.E.2d at 760-61. 
24 [d. at 2098, 353 N.E.2d at 762. The actual target rate of return was increased to 
11.5% for bodily injury insurance to compensate for the greater impact of inflation on 
that line of insurance. [d. 
25/d. at 2099, 353 N.E.2d at 762. 
28/d. at 2099-2100, 353 N.E.2d at 763. 
271d. at 2100,353 N.E.2d at 763. 
28/d. This third risk results from the fact that insurers need capital to pay the claims 
of their insured. If an insurer with large potential liability (i.e., premium volume) and 
relatively little retained capital (a high-ratio insurer) experiences heavy losses, it may 
have to sell investments to pay claims. On the other hand, the high-ratio insurer will re-
turn a greater profit, through its greater investment, if it experiences lighter losses. 
Thus, the potential investor will require a larger rate of return from a high-ratio in-
surer than from a low-ratio insurer. See id. at 2100, 353 N.E.2d at 763. 
29 [d. 
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Rather than remanding for the creation of a new target rate of re-
turn however, the Court engaged in an independent review of the re-
cord before the Commissioner.3o Three experts had testified that a 
prospective investor would demand a rate of return of at least fifteen 
percent from a real-world liability insurer. 31 The model insurer, how-
ever faced fewer risks than a real-world insurer because it maintained 
a "risk free" investment policy32 and a low ratio of premium volume 
to capital. 33 On this basis, two of the three experts claimed that the 
potential investor would accept a ten percent rate of return in the 
model insurer.34 Since the Commissioner employed the same target 
rate of return, arrived at through a different method,35 the Court af-
firmed the allowance for profits, even though the Commissioner criti-
cized the experts' figures as "loose estimates,"36 and the experts them-
selves claimed that "more careful analysis would be needed to reach a 
precise figure .... "37 As if to excuse this application of the maxim 
that "hard cases make bad law," the Court said: "In reaching this re-
sult we are mindful that the Commissioner's approach to the profit al-
lowance is not only novel but complicated, and that somewhat greater 
imprecision must be tolerated in its initial application than might be 
acceptable in later years. "38 
Overall the Rate case is not an endorsement of the methods used by 
the Commissioner in calculating the allowance for profits in the 1976 
automobile insurance rates. It stands instead as a starting point for a 
more careful articulation of how profit allowances should be deter-
mined in insurance rate cases. In a pragmatic sense, the case accomp-
lished something for all parties. The Commissioner, ignoring the 
Court's criticism of a central part of his method, has been left to claim 
victory. Insurers, on the other hand, finding strong sympathy for 
their contentions as to the proper way to proceed, are left with the 
hope that a future case will establish their proposed method as the 
proper one. 
30 See id. at 2101-02, 353 N.E.2d at 763-64. 
31 [d. at 2101, 353 N.E.2d at 763. 
32 [d. at 2102, 353 N.E.2d at 763. See note 23, at step 1 supra. 
33 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. [d. at 2101-02, 353 N.E.2d at 763. The model insurer retained 
one dollar of capital for every two dollars of potential liability. Real insurers would re-
tain one dollar of capital for every three or more dollars of potential liability. [d. See 
note 28 supra. 
34 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2102,353 N.E.2d at 763-64. 
35 See text at note 24 supra. 
38 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2102,353 N.E.2d at 764. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. at 2102-03,353 N.E.2d at 764. 
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